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Introduction 
The ongoing financial and debt crisis in Greece provides a fertile ground for the 
rise of political extremism. Although right-wing extremism is a unique 
phenomenon in Greek politics during the last three decades, its causes were 
deeply rooted in society and politics many years ago. 
Fears and feelings of socio-cultural insecurity were on the rise since the 
beginning of the 1990s: immigration, aspects of multiculturalism in an -until 
then- homogenous Greek society, Europeanization and globalization were the 
reasons for the widespread anxiety and dissatisfaction that have begun to 
overwhelm the so-called modernization losers and the most weak segments of 
the Greek society. In other words, those parts nowadays mostly attracted by the 
broad variety of antisystemic and populist actors that have emerged from one 
end to the other of the political arena in Greece. 
A deeper sense of anti-westernism1 and anti-pluralism that goes back to the 
19th century, as well as the rise of populism in the 1980s2, constituted the base 
and the fertile ground for the cultivation of new fears and new kinds of insecurity 
in the era of the financial crisis. That said, the demand for radical politics after 
2010 was not only a consequence of the financial and debt crisis in Greece, but 
also the coincidence of a series of crises regarding the political institutions and 
the cohesion of the social fabric.  
                                                             
1
 Prevélakis G. (2012), The history behing the collapse, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-
12-23-prevelakis-en.html ; Makrides V.N. (2009), «Orthodox Anti-Westernism Today: A 
Hindrance to European Integration?», International Journal for the Study of the Christian 
Church, Vol.9, No3, pp. 209-224. 
2
 Lyrintzis Christos, (1987) “The Power of Populism: The Greek Case”, European Journal of 
Political Research, 15:6, 667-86.  
323 
 
 
                                              ANUARI DEL CONFLICTE SOCIAL 2013                                                                             
 
Voters’ disenchantment with politics: causes and forms of expression   
 
The Greek party system and the political contest have witnessed significant 
changes since the outbreak of the economic crisis. If we consider the electoral 
results of May and June 2012 as a safe indicator of party competition, three 
major shifts have to be underlined3: 
Firstly, the widespread disenchantment with traditional, mainstream political 
parties, reflected in the spectacular electoral losses of the centre-left (PASOK) 
and centre-right (ND) parties. Secondly, the impressive score of the radical left 
(SYRIZA), which until that date was a minor party of the left, embracing Maoist, 
Trotskyist, Marxist and Stalinist groups and factions. And third, a comfortable 
parliamentarian representation of the Golden Dawn (GD), currently the most 
xenophobic, racist, right-wing extremist party of European parliaments. 
 
Figure 1. A spatial illustration of Greek party competition from 2009 to 
2012 
 
 
 
Source: Dinas and Rori, 2013. 
                                                             
3 
On the 2012 elections and changes in the party system and the party competition, see Dinas 
E., Rori L., «Fear and Loathing in the Polls», West European Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 270–
282.  
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Note: The horizontal axis represents a broadly-defined ideological continuum 
ranging from left (0) to right (10). The exact positioning of the parties in this 
continuum for the 2012 elections is based on and adapted from Gemenis 
(2012). The vertical axis denotes the vote share of the parties (in percentages).  
 
Undoubtedly, the rise of the GD has been the most schocking evolution. 
Notwithstanding its extremist, ultra-nationalist, racist, anti-parlementarian and 
Nazi-friendly ideological profile, what has been mostly alarming was the rapid 
ascendance of a violent groupuscule that until the local elections of 2010 has 
had an extremely marginal electoral appeal.  
 
Graph 1. The background of the electoral rise of Golden Dawn in 
European (E), Parliamentary (P) and Local (L) elections: from the margin 
to the political arena 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior, official results, http://www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/. 
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Table 1. The electoral evolution of the Golden Dawn from 1994 to 2012 
 
Electoral Year 
(Types of elections)                        
 Electoral results 
                  
  
Seats 
1994(E) 0.11   7.242 - 
1996(P) 0.07   4.487 - 
1999(E) 0.75  48.532 - 
2002(M) 0.30   1.059 - 
2004(Ε) 0.17  10.618 - 
2006(M) 1,34    3.705 - 
2009(Ε) 0.46  23.609 - 
2009(P) 0.29  19.624 - 
2010(M) 5,29  10.222 1 
2012/May(P) 6.97 441.018 21 
2012/June(P) 6,92 425.990 18 
 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, official results, 
http://www.ypes.gr/el/Elections/. 
 
By gaining 7% in the 2012 elections, the GD rapidly shifts from the margins into 
the political arena. It is mostly appealing to men, to the relatively young (25-44 
years old), to people of secondary education and to individuals experiencing 
labour insecurity (unemployed, self-employed, students, farmers).  
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Table 2. The social demography of the Greek electorate in June 2012 (in 
%) 
 
 KKE 
 
SYRIZA DIMAR PASOK ND ANEL Golden 
Dawn 
Men 
Women 
 
18-34 
4,8 
4,1 
 
4.0 
25,8 
28,4 
 
30,8 
5,6 
7,2 
 
6,1 
13,1 
11,2 
 
6,7 
28,8 
30,8 
 
21,1 
7,0 
8,3 
 
11,2 
9,1 
4,0 
 
11,3 
35-54 4,0 32,0 7,5 9,6 25,0 8,4 8,4 
55+ 5,4 18,6 4,9 19,1 40,6 4,1 4,1 
Employers/Self
-employed 
3,5 29,9 5,5 9,6 26,5 8,9 8,8 
Employees of 
the private 
sector 
4,7 32,3 7,9 8,2 23,5 10,2 7,3 
Employees of 
the public 
sector 
3,3 30,0 8,1 10,7 25,0 7,3 8,1 
Farmers 4,4 21,2 3,2 18,8 34,3 4,6 8,6 
Unemployed 5,9 35,6 4,8 6,8 19,4 10,2 10,1  
Students 4,0 31,2 7,5 6,0 20,3 9,4 9,4 
Pensioners 5,3 15,8 5,1 20,2 43,1 4,0 2,7 
Housewives 4,2 24,3 5,5 14,4 37,0 5,0 4,0 
 
Source: Exit poll, June 2012. 
 
Understanding the electoral breakthrough of the GD: decline of trust in 
political institutions. 
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In order for one to answer how did a pariah of the extreme right manage to 
enter into the political spectrum, one has to take under consideration the 
political context of the 2012 elections and the social background that lies behind 
the rise of the GD. Among short-term factors, the economic crisis, the austerity 
measures (Memorandum), the polarization and the cleavages that they 
nourished constitute the fertile ground for the rise of the extremes and the 
populist vote: according to the 2012 exit poll 53% casted their vote having in 
mind the Memorandum, whereas 47% by having in mind the stay in the 
Eurozone. Apart from the short-term factors, one can observe medium-term 
factors that accounted for the dramatic shift in the party’s electoral fortunes: 
there has been a stready decline in the levels of political trust since 2009, which 
has accelerated since the emergence of the crisis.  
 
Table 3. Political Trust: Decline –lack of confidence in parties 
Trust in political institutions  (% of a lot or some trust) 
government  parties  parliament    courts 
    
2003 2010  2003 2010  2003 2010  2003 2010 
 
55 21  28 5  63 47  73 41 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 2003 & 2010; Exadaktylos & Zahariadis 2012. 
 
We can observe a general decline in the trust in governments and parties as 
well as in the legislative and judiciary institutions between 2003 and 2010. 
Furthermore, compared to the countries in Southern Europe and to the 
countries in crisis, Greece shows the strongest decline in political trust (in 
parliaments) after the emergence of the crisis in 2009, as well as an erosion of 
political trust years before the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
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Graph 2. Trends in net trust in national parliament  
(net trust=the % of citizens who trust minus the % of citizens who mistrust) 
 
 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer, 69-73 & Special Eurobarometer 71.1; F. Roth 
(2010). 
 
If we look deeper into the 2012 data (Table 4), political trust is particularly low 
as well as trust in political institutions linked to interests’ representation like 
trade unions and the parliaments, or to the EU and the IMF, whereas it rises 
when it comes to social institutions which are perceived as unifing factors of the 
social body, offering security or spiritual cohesion within the ethno-cultural 
entity.  
 
Table 4. Trust in Institutions in Greece: (0-10 point scale, 0=no trust at all, 10=complete trust) 
Army 6.1 
Church 5.6 
Police 5.3 
Justice 4.2 
NGOs 3.9 
United Nations 3.3 
EU 3.0 
Trade Unions 2.7 
Parliament 2.6 
IMF 1.8 
 
Source: Metron Analysis, 2012. 
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Climate of pessimism and lack of social cohesion within the electorate: a 
political opportunity for the Golden Dawn? 
 
Luck of trust in political institutions notwithstanding, populist votes need to be 
seen through the prism of social feelings about cohesion in order to understand 
what drives demand for alternatives to austerity policies. Greek citizens not only 
distrust political institutions, but they feel abandoned, feared and dissapointed. 
Among them, most of all the youngest and the middle ages (voters of the GD 
but SYRIZA as well).  
 
Graph 3. A climate of pessimism and loss of life perspectives 
 
  
Source: Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation & Metron Analysis 2012. 
 
Taking into account voters’ feelings in the beginning of the crisis concerning 
their personal situation, from 2004 to 2008 the majority of citizens were (fairly 
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and very) optimistic, whereas since the beginning of the crisis there has been a 
radical decline in the levels of optimism. Since March 2010 extremely 
pessimistic views are majoritarian. Hence there is a steady deficit of social trust 
since the beginning of the crisis. 
Social fragmentation, tension and inequality become even more apparent when 
we delve into social feelings distinguished upon age groups. The high levels of 
unemployment4, especially among the youngest generations5, as well as 
privileges that have been unfairly distributed to different interest groups of the 
economic system since the 1974 transition to democracy6 have created strong 
barriers in the career-development of the youngest generations, that since the 
beginning of the crisis can no longer satisfy their needs through their parents’ 
declining revenues.  
 
Graph 4. Social Cohesion and Generational Gap: the feeling of being abandoned 
 
Source: Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation & Metron Analysis 2012. 
 
                                                             
4
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics 
5
 Tubadji A., «Youth Unemployment in Greece. Economic and Political Perspectives», Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung Study, November 2012. 
6
 Iordanoglou Chryssafis, The state and interest groups. A critique to conventional wisdom, 
Athens: Polis, 2013. (in Greek) 
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Question: «Thinking about your parents’ position and life, would you say that 
you are today in a better position, in the same position or in a worse position?» 
 
This feeling of intergenerational injustice is clearly reflected in public opinion. 
Citizens from 18 to 54 feel that they are in a worse position and that they 
experience worse life conditions than their parents, whereas citizens older than 
55 years old feel that they are in a better one than their parents. The feeling of 
unjustice accociated with the sense of lower expectations are the prerequisites 
for the spread of distrust and disenchentment with mainstream politics and the 
established political institutions.  
 
Forms of political engagement: party membership, online debates and 
street movements 
Disenchentment with traditional parties, lack of political and social trust, as well 
as lack of social cohesion have created demand for anti-political and anti-
parlementarian political stances. Active engagement in politics has shifted from 
mainstream political parties to grassroot action and protest. Four are the 
«highlights» of the Greek crisis’ experience: the outraged residents of Athens, 
the movement of the outraged citizens (the Greek indignants), the «I don’t pay 
movement» and violent activism in local areas. 
 
a. The outraged residents of Athens and the strategy of the Golden Dawn 
In the city of Athens, the feelings of fear, dissapointment and abandonment 
have been expressed through grassroot movements (the Citizens’ Committees) 
in the most underprivileged and densely populated by immigrants areas of the 
city center (6th city district). This context has served as a structure of political 
opportunity for the electoral ascendance of the GD7, which followed a two-step 
strategy. At first, from autumn 2008 to November 2010 Golden Dawn acquired 
                                                             
7
 Dinas E., Georgiadou V., Konstantinidis I., Rori L. (2013), “From dusk to dawn: local party 
organization and party success of right-wing extremism”, Party Politics, December (Online 
First).  
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local presence, mobilization and visibility within a part of the city center. Having 
created a stronghold, it succeeded its electoral breakthrough in the city of 
Athens. Afterwards, from November 2010 to May/June 2012, GD expanded its 
organizational penetration and territorial diffusion. This is how it succeeded 
electoral rise at the national level. 
In other words, following a well-known tactic in right-wing extremist European 
parties8, GD chooses the area of Agios Panteleimonas (AP), a neighborhood in 
the 6th district of Athens with a large immigrant population, as a stronghold in 
order to acquire a local presence and, through it, further visibility. AP, as well as 
the 6th city district to which it belongs, became the base of the organisation.  
More specifically, since September 2008, regular residents’ assemblies take 
place around the square of AP in order to protest against immigrants’ 
concentration and “reclaim” their neighborhood. Four kinds of actors constituted 
the scenery: the “outraged residents” –who belong to an old conservative 
middle class–, the GD, the immigrants and the “solidarists”, i.e. left-wing 
activists expressing support vis-à-vis the immigrants. From 2008 to 2010 we 
counted at least 20 different committees or/and associations of residents. 
Among them, at least 10 have gradually built ties with GD. Progressively people 
were divided in two camps: the “outraged residents” with GD versus the 
immigrants with leftist activists. GD progressively merged with the committees 
of residents. It used a two-fold method in order to penetrate in the local 
population. One the one hand, it provided goods and services to the aged 
people and security to shop owners. On the other, it used violence in order to 
“protect” against the “rivals”.  
Violence is an instrument of double utility in the strategy of the organization: it 
uses it as a means of confrontation with the perceived enemies and as a 
symbol of power in order to attract members and voters. From 2008 to 2010, 
GD brings into play violence against immigrants, regardless of their legal status, 
                                                             
8
 Mudde C. (2007), Populist Radical Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 269. 
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antifa activists, and socially vulnerable individuals, like drug addicts, homeless 
etc. It exploits the presence of pro-immigrant activists and antifa groups in order 
to create acceptance and proximity with the local population and acquire 
visibility. Interactive extremism9 between pro-immigrant groups and the GD 
further divided the inhabitants and reinforced the right-wing extremists. 
GD utilizes traditional communication practices of mass parties in the local 
level: local press, door-to-door techniques and grass-roots politics, like 
demonstrations and assemblies in order to create the stronghold. For this same 
reason, it consciously transfers its headquarters close to the neighborhood of 
AP.  
The GD succeeded in augmenting its sphere of influence, in recruiting and 
promoting activists, as well as in placing a series of issues in the public agenda. 
It gained visibility and settled in the local political terrain. The institutional 
representation that it acquired through the election of its leader in the city 
council of Athens in the municipal elections of 2010 gave to GD a sense of 
legitimacy, further visibility and mediatization, that permitted further 
organizational expansion and electoral penetration in the 2012 parliamentary 
elections. 
GD’s empowerment since the 2012 elections goes hand in hand with the 
proliferation of a violent activism, to which we refer later.  
 
b. The movement of the squares and the outraged citizens («Aganaktismenoi») 
It was the most massive and enduring protest movement in the post-junta 
period. In the summer of 2011, thousands of citizens were concentrating every 
night in the Constitution Square and in other central squares of the biggest 
cities in order to express their rage against the political personnel, the 
parliament, the political system. Its success is certainly related to the extense 
use of social media as a tool for mobilization, diffusion and organization. Athens 
                                                             
9
 Richards B. (2013), Nationalist extremism and the hatred of the liberal state. In: Demertzis N 
(ed.) Emotions and Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
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was the epicentre of the protest. The placement of the mass vis-à-vis the 
parliament was highly symbolic.  
Right-wing extremist and left activists, but also neutral and apolitical voters 
participated in this movement. The extreme-right activists were placed in the 
upper side of the square, whereas the left-wing were established in the lower 
one. A Popular Assembly was taking place every night. Numerous tents were 
placed in the square and activists lived there in order to mark the occupation. 
According to some findings of an unpublished research10 although the outraged 
citizens supported a diffuse –quite frequently idealist- idea of democracy, there 
is no specific support in democracy as an applied regime or system of 
government. Furthermore, despite the fact that violence is condemned, the fact 
that 2/3 of the respondents were either tolerant to the violence that others used 
against politicians (34%) or in favor (27%) of it, indicates the complicated and 
sensitive link between direct political action and democratic authority. Last but 
not least, what the mass mobilization of outraged citizens in Athens has 
revealed  is that the reservoir of violence or even of use violence is  large within 
the different social milieux, as well as the rejection of parliamentary democracy. 
Antiparliamentarism, antipartyism and an attitude of protest were all present 
after the outbreak of the financial crisis in Greece. 
 
c. "I won't pay movement"  
The “I won’t pay movement” was a citizens’ mobilization against paying taxes, 
although the question remains if it is an action of civil disobedience or a play-it-
safe-revolt of the middle class against the austerity measures without the risk of 
facing the legal consequences; in other words what is known to be rather a free 
                                                             
10
 Georgiadou, V., Kafe, A. & Pierides, C. (2012) ‘Anti-party, anti-parliamentary or anti-
democratic social movements of the “Outraged” citizens in Greece’, paper presented at the 
22nd World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Madrid, 8–12 July. 
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rider behavior than a stace of civil disobedience.11 As far as the repertory of the 
"won't pay movement" is concerned, it includes the blockade of highway tool 
booths, coverage subway ticket machines,  refusal of paying property tax, giving 
access to electricity to housholds that have been deprived from it due to their 
debt to the electricity public enterprise, legal support of their members and so 
on. 
In May 2012, the “I won’t pay movement” participated in the elections, in which 
it managed to gain 55.675 votes. Since then, it maintains a double nature –
social movement and political party at the same time. Even though its repertoire 
of collective action is hardly legal, the proliferation of the offered services 
nourishes its clientèle, which is constituted by economically week and socially 
underdog strata. After the 2012 elections the influence of this organization has 
been visibly reduced. 
 
d. Violent activism related to local issues 
Acceptance of certain forms of violence was ingrained in the Greek society as 
historians like Koliopoulos and Veremis have shown12. Political violence itself, 
as well as tolerance vis-à-vis violence has been exacerbated throughout the 
Greek economic crisis13. Nonetheless, after the 2012 parliamentary elections 
mobilization became openly and particularly violent, as the local anti-gold 
investment movement in Skouries14 and the violent activity of the GD in the 
                                                             
11
 «We Won’t Pay: Greece’s Middle Class Revolt Against Austerity”, Der Spiegel, 23.09.2011 
(http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/we-won-t-pay-greece-s-middle-class-revolt-against-
austerity-a-787847.html). 
12
 Koliopoulos J. S., Veremis T. M., Modern Greece: A History since 1821, Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010. 
13
 For an indicative but non exhaustive list of political violence incidents from 2008 to 2013, see 
http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231230686  
14
 The investment of the Greek company Hellas Gold and its main shareholder Canadian 
Eldorado Gold Camp in four gold mining projects in Skouries - an ancient forest in the region of 
Chalkidiki, in Nothern Greece - has mobilized the local society, local and national political actors 
in order to protest against its environmental-threatening character. Opponents of the projects 
include owners of houses rented to tourists, environmentalists and leftist activists. Local 
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popular southwest areas of Keratsini and Perama have revealed15. This new 
kind of violent activism is located in certain local areas. Whereas the first one is 
left-wing driven and is addressing a local problem with economic and 
environmental repercussions for the natives, the second one is right-wing driven 
and concerns the strategy of the GD in order to penetrate in the popular 
suburbs by the means of frontal confrontation with the Left in order to win the 
blue collars, the youth and the insecure. 
The common feature of all these phenomena was their anti-systemic and 
populist mass character.  
 
Electoral motives in the local elections of 2010 and the double 
parliamentary elections of 2012: xenophobia, political protest, and the 
financial crisis 
In national elections immigration did not figure among the dominant issues of 
the public agenda. On the contrary, it has been high during the municipal 
elections of 2010, at least for the residents of the city centre. The lack of public 
policy concerning immigration, coupled with the dense concentration of 
immigrants in certain areas of the city centre, the fear of the local population vis-
à-vis the immigrants, which they have been conntecting to criminality and 
unemployment, have created a momentum of political opportunity for the 
electoral breakthrough of the GD in 2010. The GD was the anti-immigrant party 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
communities have been bitterly divided since 2012 and the opposed residents have held 
several demonstrations against it, many of which have turned violent. The movement of 
Skouries has acquired support especially –but not exclusively- from the left and citizens 
throughout the country, who organized demonstrations in Athens and in Thessaloniki in 2012 
and 2013 as well. 
15
 On September 12th, 2013, 50 members of the GD hit brutally communist cadres of the union 
of metalworkers, in the area known as the Zone of Perama, a tough, blue-collar region, reliant 
on heavy industry and the shipyards until the crash came and pushed unemployment over 90%. 
Only a few days later, on September 18
th
, 2013 Pavlos Fyssas, an antifa, community activist 
and rapper known as Killah P, was stabbed to death on Panagi Tsaldari avenue, a commercial 
and well-lit street of Keratsini, which is a popular suburb of Pireaus. Fyssas was murdered by an 
unemployed track driver and member of the Golden Dawn named Giorgos Roupakias. 
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par excellence: not only it was against immigrants but it proclaimed immediate 
expel of all immigrants living in the coultry, regardless of their official status. 
Hence, in the 2010 municipal elections anti-immigrant stances favoured the 
vote for the GD. But this was not the case in 2012. What motivated vote for the 
GD in the last parliamentary elections? 
If we compare the motives of the GD voters to those of all the voters, it 
becomes clear that it was political protest, anti-parlementarian and antipolitical 
stances, the opposition vis-à-vis the Memorandum and the issue of 
permanence in the Eurozone which motivated citizens to vote for the GD.16  
 
Table 5. Electoral Motives in the 2012 parliamentary election 
 
Motives 
Voters of Golden 
Dawn 
(in %) 
All voters 
(in %) 
To create a one-party 
government 
8 39 
To create a coalition 
government 
14 35 
The rise of a strong opposition 38 11 
To reject political parties 40 14 
Discussions on Memorandum 71 53 
Discussions on Euro 47 29 
 
Source:  Exit Poll May & June 2012. 
 
What kind of voters are right-wing extremist voters and the voters of the 
extreme right in general? Fieschi, Morris & Cabalerro (2012) distinguish among  
                                                             
16
 Georgiadou, V. (2013) Right-Wing Populism and Extremism: The Rapid Rise of "Golden 
Dawn" in Crisis-Ridden Greece', in Melzer, R. & Serafin, S. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in 
Europe. Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labour-Market Oriented Exit-Strategies, 
 Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert Foundation. 
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 committed radicals: “people who vote for a RPP and are close to a RPP”,  
 reluctant radicals: “people who vote for a RPP but are not close to a 
RPP”, and  
 potential radicals: “people who do not vote for a RPP but who are against 
immigration”.17  
 
So far, we do not dispose sufficient data in order to be able to discern the GD 
voters with a similar typology. However, we can discern their political 
congruence (according to their ideological distance from the party positions) in 
three categories: 
 
Table 6. Ideological proximity to the Golden Dawn in 2012 
 
Ideological distance from Golden 
Dawn 
National Elections,  
May 2012 
(in %) 
National elections 
June 2012 
(in%) 
Too close 44 48 
Neither nor 37 37 
Far away 19 15 
Source:  Exit Poll May & June 2012. 
 
With regard to Golden Dawn voters and their proximity to the party they have 
voted for, almost half of those admitted that they are very close to it, while one-
fifth to one-sixth remained ideologically unaffected by the Golden Dawn (Table 
6). Those who have voted for the right-wing extremist party without sharing its 
ideology constitute a small part of the entire electorate of Golden Dawn. 
                                                             
17
 Fieschi, C., Morris, M. & Caballero, L. (2012) Recapturing the Reluctant Radical, London: 
Counterpoint, 
http://tsforum.event123.no/UD/rehc2013/pop.cfm?FuseAction=Doc&pAction=View&pDocumentI
d=46621 
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Concluding remark 
The enduring and constant lack of public policies vis-à-vis immigration 
contributed to the electoral increase of the Golden Dawn. Voting for Golden 
Dawn was a choice of rejection rather than a positive one. Voting for the Golden 
Dawn meant almost for the half of its electorate voting against all the others: the 
institutions, the ideologies, and the establishment. For more than a year after 
the elections the political system seemed unable to address the problem of 
right-wing extremism and face the Golden Dawn: the Conservatives tried to 
respond to its accusations by embracing the “law and order” and the anti-
immigrant agenda in order to attract the GD electorate; the Socialists and the 
Left tried to stigmatize the Extreme Right and to put it at the margins. Nor the 
one, neither the other seem to be appropriate methods to confront with it. 
Since the brutal murder of the anti-fascist musician Pavlos Fyssas in September 
2013, the public outraged that followed and serious EU pressures in order to 
deal with the problem, the democratic institutions have found a way of reaction 
towards criminal actions engaged by the extremist party. The public prosecutor 
has labeled the GD a criminal organization and several party members have 
been arrested. Among them, the leader, the party sub-leader, the spokesman, 
the press officer and the man who constituted the link between the 
parliamentary group and the party’s paramilitary structure. The GD is linked to 
multiple offenses, among which murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, 
trafficking, kidnapping, money-laundering and extortion.  
Prosecution of the party members is reflected with losses in public support 
towards the GD in the polls. Nonetheless, the fact that the party keeps a stable 
support equal or even superior to its electoral forces needs to raise awareness 
on the strong roots on populism and extremism in the Greek society and 
eventual institutional responses of countering the phenomenon. 
 
 
 
